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Dubious Partnership: The Legal, Political,
and Economic Implications of Adding the
United Kingdom to the North American
Free Trade Agreement
Daniel S. Potts*
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has never fully embraced close
ties with the European continent. The debates in the United
Kingdom over the adoption of the euro and membership in the
European Union (EU) exemplify this resistance. Members of
the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom have been lead-
ers in this resistance movement. Over the past few years, an-
other aspect of this resistance movement has been advanced. A
small, vocal minority of the Conservative Party has recently be-
gun advocating the pursuit of a free trade agreement with North
America.1 Originally, these advocates saw joining the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a viable economic
alternative to EU membership. 2 Recently, however, the Conser-
vatives have asserted that a NAFTA-U.K. agreement would be
compatible with United Kingdom's membership in the EU and
are preparing the EU to embrace U.K. membership in NAFTA.3
The debate has occurred predominantly in the United
Kingdom and has remained largely absent from American
shores. However, a small wing of the Republican Party, led by
Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, brought this issue to the United
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 1994, Michi-
gan State University.
1. George Monbiot, Vote Tory for a Federal Superstate: Joining Nafta as
Hague Proposes Would Destroy Our Independence, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 7, 2000, at
20.
2. Id.
3. See id.
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States (U.S.) by supporting a NAFTA-U.K. trade agreement. 4
During an address in London in the summer of 2000, Senator
Gramm mentioned that while Americans do not currently dis-
cuss the topic, "they will."'5 Moreover, then-Presidential candi-
date George W. Bush's foreign policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, 6
stated during the summer of 2000 that if the United Kingdom
applied to join NAFTA, the United States would not object.7 As
a result of the likelihood of an increased debate regarding U.K.
membership in NAFTA in this country and apparent support
from the White House, it is important to analyze three signifi-
cant issues raised by such an agreement.
The first variable to consider is how this proposed agree-
ment would affect the economies of both the United Kingdom
and North America. The next major economic relationship to
consider is the potential effect on the United Kingdom's rela-
tions and treaty obligations with the EU. Finally, the United
Kingdom and the United States must speculate about how the
EU might react to such an arrangement and whether the EU
could take punitive action against United Kingdom under the
treaty establishing the EU.
This Note will examine the viability of U.K. membership in
NAFTA. Part I outlines a brief history of NAFTA and the EU.
Part II looks at the relationship between NAFTA countries, the
United Kingdom, and the EU. Part III discusses the economic,
legal, and political consequences of U.K. membership in
NAFTA. Finally, the Conclusion contends that the Republicans
in the United States and the Conservatives in the United King-
dom who support this proposal have failed to fully consider the
implications of their proposal. The Conclusion further contends
that the costs of U.K. membership in NAFTA would outweigh
the benefits for both the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. Bronwen Maddox & James Landale, Senator Urges Sceptics to Back U.S.
Pact, THE TIMES OF LONDON, July 5, 2000, at 4.
5. Senator Phil Gramm, Address at a meeting of the Centre for Policy Studies
on Euroland and NAFTA (July 4, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.cps.org.uk/gramm.htm ) [hereinafter Gramm Address].
6. Rice is currently President Bush's National Security Advisor. See, e.g.,
Mike Allen, Bush Taps Rice for Security Advisor, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at Al.
7. Toby Harnden, Bush aide supports Britain in Nafta, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, July 29, 2000, available at http://news.telegraph.co.uk.
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I. FORMATION OF NAFTA AND THE EU
A. NAFTA FORMATION
Circumstances leading to the formation of NAFTA date
back to the 1930s,8 when major trade barriers existed against
agricultural goods throughout the world.9 Mexico had imposed
large barriers against agricultural commodities from the United
States.10 Efforts to address these barriers led to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.11 The GATT
did not mandate free trade, but encouraged member states to
enter into agreements to reduce trade barriers either through a
common market or a free trade zone. 12 A common market en-
courages the free exchange of capital and labor, whereas a free
trade zone "offers special trading concessions" to its member
states.1
3
The most widely recognized common market is the Euro-
pean Community (EC).14 The integration of Europe into the
European Community motivated negotiations for a free trade
zone for North America. 5 In the 1980s, the United States and
Canada negotiated a trade agreement that reduced trade barri-
8. James B. Wadley & Cynthia Langford, What NAFTA Means to Midwest Ag-
riculture: A View From the Edge of the Flinthills, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 255, 258 (1995).
9. These trade barriers were caused by:
As the populations increased throughout the world and modes of transpor-
tation improved, the complexity of trading conflicts increased. The failure
to negotiate structured agriculture trade practices in the post World War II
period and the complexity of agricultural trade issues caused the interna-
tional trade in agricultural commodities to be plagued with trade barriers
and predatory practices.
Id. at 258.
10. Id.
11. This was the "most expansive effort" that resulted from these early trade
negotiations. Wadley & Langford, supra note 8, at 259; See generally General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
12. GATT art. XXIV.
13. Free trade zones also do not encourage integration of the economies of
member states, whereas a common market does encourage such integration. Wad-
ley & Langford, supra note 8, at 259; See also GATT art. XXIV.
14. The Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community, which is
the forerunner of the present European Community. Wadley & Langford, supra
note 8, at 259.
15. Some saw the European Community as a challenge to North America, and
this seems to have stimulated the interest in a free trade zone for North America.
Id.
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ers between the two countries. 16 Both countries signed the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in 1988.17
In June 1990, Mexico entered into negotiations to establish a
trilateral free trade agreement with the United States and Can-
ada.18 Negotiations for a free trade agreement began in Febru-
ary 1991.19 These negotiations led to the establishment of
NAFTA, which entered into force on January 1, 1994.20 NAFTA
is designed to eliminate all trade barriers between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico and create the largest "totally free"
trade zone in the world.21
B. EU FORMATION
Hopes for European political and economic unification be-
gan at the end of World War 11.22 The possibility of future hos-
tility among the European states was the prime motivation be-
hind the proposed unification. 23 On May 9, 1950, French
Foreign Minister Robert Schumann proposed the unification of
the French and German coal and steel industries as the first
step.24 Schumann's proposal was seen as revolutionary because
of the competitiveness between these particular industries in
the two countries. 25 Despite such obstacles, the treaty establish-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed
in Paris on April 18, 1951.26 Efforts to create a European De-
fense Community and a European Political Community failed, 27
but on March 25, 1957 two treaties signed in Rome created the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)28 and the
16. Id. at 260.
17. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281.
18. Wadley & Langford, supra note 8, at 260.
19. This was initiated by President Bush's announcement to Congress that
CUSTA was to become trilateral. Id.
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
101, 32 1 L.M. 289, 297 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
21. Wadley & Langford, supra note 8, at 261.
22. Christine Alice Corcos, EEC Law: A Practical Guide, 22 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 195, 197 (1990).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY].
27. Corcos, supra note 22, at 197.
28. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY]; See Lisa Borgfeld White,
The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of the European Court of Justice
[Vol. 11: 155
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European Economic Community (EEC). 9 These agreements in-
cluded six states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. 30 The United Kingdom was invited
to join this union, but declined. 31 In 1967, the Merger Treaty
provided that the four institutions32 created by the ECSC Treaty
serve the European Communities jointly.33
The United Kingdom joined the EEC on January 1, 1973
along with Denmark and Ireland34 mainly because of the poten-
tial economic and labor improvements inherent in member-
ship.35 On July 1, 1987, the Single European Act became effec-
tive, which provided for a single, internal market within the
EEC. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered
into force on November 1, 1993, formed the EU and provided for
"economic, monetary, and political union. 37 The Treaty of Am-
sterdam formed the present European Community in 1997. a8 In
this Note, the countries that are parties to this treaty will collec-
tively be referred to as the EU.
and the Court's Latest Challenge, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 833, 836 (1996).
29. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
30. EURATOM TREATY pmbl.
31. Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of
the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092, 1094
(1995).
32. The four institutions are Commission, Council, Parliament, and European
Court of Justice (ECJ). White, supra note 28, at 836.
33. The three European Communities are the ECSC, Euroatom, and the EEC.
White, supra note 28, at 836.
34. Id.
35. Allen Neely, U.K. Resistance to European Integration: An Historical and
Legal Analysis With an Examination of the United Kingdom's Recent Entry into the
European Monetary System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 114 (1991).
36. White, supra note 28, at 836.
37. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION pmbl., Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 4 (1992)
[hereinafter TEUI.
38. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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II. RELATIONS BETWEEN NAFTA COUNTRIES, THE EU,
AND UNITED KINGDOM
A. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU
1. Development of a common market: From EEC to the EU
European unification began in 1951 with the formation of
the ECSC and the EEC, forerunners of the present-day EU.
3 9
The United Kingdom's ties to the ECSC and the EEC were trou-
bled, with a late membership application in 196240 and the halt-
ing of negotiations in 196341 due to fears of eroding national sov-
ereignty.42 The United Kingdom debated the issue internally
until electing to join formally in 1972.43 When the United King-
dom joined the European Economic Community, it entered into
the Community as a "dualist" country,44 meaning that the treaty
would not become part of U.K. domestic law unless passed by an
Act of Parliament. 45 The treaty became U.K. law with Parlia-
ment's passage of the European Communities Act of 1972.46
The EEC became the EU in 1992 through the TEU.47 The
TEU established the common goal of a single European cur-
rency.48 The TEU has a wider policy scope than the EEC did, in-
cluding issues such as a "common foreign and security policy"
and "justice and home affairs."49 The Treaty of Amsterdam sub-
sequently amended the TEU5  and created the current Treaty
Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)."'
39. Neely, supra note 35, at 114.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. This position was summarized by Hugh Gaitskell of the U.K Labour Party
when he warned of the "end of United Kingdom as an independent European
state.., the end of a thousand years of history." Id. at 118; See also infra Part
II(a)(2).
43. Neely, supra note 35, at 113.
44. Michael H. Lee, Revolution, Evolution, Devolution: Confusion? The Ero-
sion of the "Supremacy of Parliament" and the Expanding Powers of the Courts in the
United Kingdom, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 465, 466 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Tore Totdal, An Introduction to the European Community and to European
Community Law, 75 N.D. L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1999).
48. TEU art. B.
49. TEU art. B.
50. Treaty of Amsterdam pmbl.
51. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
[Vo1.11:155
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EU law has supremacy over the law of its member states
through the doctrine of direct effects. This doctrine was devel-
oped through European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases concerning
the application of community law before national courts52 and
allows the EU to override the national courts and legislatures of
its member states if national law is contrary to EU law.53 The
doctrine of direct effects also requires that members of the EU
coordinate their economic policies to ensure commonality.54
2. Double-edged sword: Internal conflict between nationalism
and benefits of a global economy
The United Kingdom's attitude toward its perceived de-
creased national sovereignty has been a major factor in its resis-
tance against integrating with Europe.5 5 EC proposals seeking
to control the United Kingdom's internal affairs in certain areas
such as agriculture, 56 immigration,57 and monetary policy 5 8 have
met resistance and have been perceived as a threat to the
United Kingdom's sovereignty. Language from U.K. leaders
also indicates that there is widespread concern over the sover-
eignty of the United Kingdom as a state and the national iden-
tity of its citizens. 59 This concern has given rise to a U.K. group
called "Eurosceptics," referring to those who generally criticize
the United Kingdom's involvement with the EU.60
Eurosceptics mainly consist of senior members of the
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
52. Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United
States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556, 572 (1996-97).
53. "The European Court of Justice has followed a steady course in finding
Community law to be both directly effective in the national courts of the Member
States and to have primacy over national legislation." Id.
54. Article 99 states that "Member States shall regard their economic policies
as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council..."
EC TREATY art. 99.
55. Neely, supra note 35, at 117.
56. Id. at 124.
57. Id. at 127.
58. Id. at 130.
59. U.K leaders from both the Labour and Conservative Parties have ex-
pressed concern over the U.K national identity. Id. at 114. Hugh Gaitskell, a
member of the Labour Party, warned of the end of United Kingdom as an independ-
ent state. Id. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative Party member,
gave "dire warnings of the dilution of national identity, the sharing of political power
and the emergence of a Brussels 'superstate.'" Id. at 118.
60. The Impact on the U.S. Economy of Including the United Kingdom in a
Free Trade Arrangement With the United States, Canada, and Mexico, USITC Pub.
3339, Inv. No. 332-409 at 1-3 (Aug. 2000) [hereinafter ITC Report].
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United Kingdom's Conservative Party.6' Despite their criticism
of the United Kingdom's involvement with the EU, Eurosceptics
advocate U.K. membership in NAFTA. 62 Opponents view this
proposal as a political method to reduce or sever ties with the
EU.63 Despite its potential effects on relations with the EU, Eu-
rosceptics believe that NAFTA membership is plausible and be-
lieve that any EU legal action would violate the policies of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).6
The United Kingdom has historically resisted integrating
with the rest of Europe. Part of the reason lies with the geogra-
phy of the United Kingdom. As an island, the United Kingdom
has been isolated from the rest of Europe, prompting some Brit-
ons to view themselves as "a small island anchored off a politi-
cally turbulent continent."65 This attitude furthered the devel-
opment of the U.K. Navy in previous centuries, allowing U.K.
colonization of lands beyond Europe.66 The development of the
U.K. economy centered on colonization and "there was little in-
centive to pursue ties with the continent."67
Centuries of economic, military, and political successes
through colonization fostered an "independent spirit" among
Britons. 68 The United Kingdom did not experience the same de-
gree of economic devastation as the rest of the European conti-
nent after 1945.69 Instead, the United Kingdom emerged trium-
61. Nicholas Watt, Major Warns Tories Against U.S. Trade Ties, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 12, 2000, at 6.
62. Nicholas Watt, Top Tories' Secret Plot to Quit EU: Eurosceptic Conserva-
tives in Talks With Americans Over Trade Deal That Could Replace Links to Conti-
nent, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 18, 2000, at 2.
63. Id.
64. Melissa Kite, Hague 'Should Take Britain Into Nafta', THE TIMES OF
LONDON, July 26, 2000, at 10.
65. Neely, supra note 35, at 116 (quoting Northedge, Britain and the EEC: Past
and Present, in BRITAIN AND THE EEC 20 (Roy Jenkins, ed. 1982)).
66. The easy access to the sea which the British Isles affords led naturally to a
national preoccupation with conquering the sea. Id. at 116. Britain, "with its vast
scattered Empire and innumerable Imperial Outposts and its unchallenged naval
might, virtually policed the world for half a century or more." C.G. BAMFORD & H.
ROBINSON, GEOGRAPHY OF THE EEC 12 (1983).
67. Neely, supra note 35, at 116.
68. Neely writes that:
The independent spirit of the U.K. is to be expected in light of their great
economic, military, and political successes of the past several centuries.
While maintaining a far-reaching colonial empire, the United Kingdom
(U.K.) was at the forefront of the industrial and agricultural revolutions of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Id. at 116.
69. Id.
[Vo1.11:155
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phant.7 0 After World War II, the United Kingdom desired to
maintain a status comparable with the United States and the
Soviet Union, the major victorious nations. 71 This caused the
United Kingdom to see itself as somewhat separate from the
"defeated or occupied"72 nations of Europe. The United Kingdom
was unable to possess the global influence of the other Allied
powers, but this postwar attitude affected future Prime Minis-
ters and explained their reluctance to join an integrated
Europe. 73
Another factor in the United Kingdom's resistance to EU
membership was that the United Kingdom had historically been
in conflict with countries on the European continent. The
United Kingdom organized international alliances against
threats by powerful states, such as France during the Napoleon
era and Germany during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury.74 With France serving as a leader in the movement toward
a unified Europe, centuries of conflict between the United King-
dom and France dampened enthusiasm among Britons to forge
an alliance with France, despite the potential benefits. 75 Senti-
ments against Germany after World War II also negatively af-
fected U.K. attitudes toward the European continent.76
Despite the resistance toward integration with the EU, the
United Kingdom recognized significant benefits from EU mem-
bership. 77 In areas such as employment, labor, and the econ-
omy, the United Kingdom saw competition with its EU counter-
parts as disadvantageous. 78 Though Eurosceptics may prefer
NAFTA membership and withdrawal from the EU, there has
not been a serious proposal for the United Kingdom to rescind
70. Neely argued that when World War II ended, the U.K did not experience
the destruction of the European continent. This led United Kingdom to see itself as
"proud and victorious" for its "national achievement" and U.K. politicians found it
difficult to "stoop to join forces with such 'down-and-outs.'" Id. (quoting Northedge,
supra note 65, at 20).
71. Roy Jenkins, United Kingdom and Europe: Post-Blair's Election and the
Pre-Single Currency, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 630, 630 (1998).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Neely, supra note 35 at 117. "Traditionally, the U.K mind-set has been one
of organizing 'international coalitions against the most threatening state of the day,
the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, the Germany of the Kaiser and Hitler." Id.
(quoting Northedge, supra note 65, at 20-21.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 117.
78. Id. at 117-118.
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its membership from the EU 9 because the policies of the two
largest parties in the United Kingdom officially advocate EU
membership. Conservative Party policy is to forge free trade
ties with North America while remaining a member of the EU.
80
Labour Party philosophy also advocates EU membership as long
as such membership will "strengthen [the U.K.'s] economic in-
terests and maintain [the U.K.'s] influence in Europe."81 In
spite of U.K. nationalism, "the economic realities of the late
twentieth century... mandated compromise"8 2 with the EU.
The United Kingdom's membership in the EU has not been
superficial, as the United Kingdom tends to implement EU di-
rectives more completely and rigorously than other EU mem-
bers.8 3 As a result, membership in the EU has had a significant
influence on U.K. economic and legal policies.84 It is estimated
that as much as two-thirds of U.K. laws are a reflection of EU
policy. 85
B. CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
In November 1999, the issue of U.K.-NAFTA ties received
attention from the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, when Sena-
tors William Roth86 and Daniel Patrick Moynihan 7 expressed
support for the proposed trade arrangement.88 On November
79. Id. (noting that with the existence of a "long-standing debate on the merits
of EU policy in the U[nited] K[ingdom] ... the certainty of U.K. membership in the
EU is generally not considered in political debate").
80. Watt, supra note 61, at 6.
81. Steve McCabe, Anti-Euro Brigade Threat to Economy, THE BIRMINGHAM
POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at 13.
82. Id. at 117.
83. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-3.
84. Id. (claiming that the "commercial and legal structures" of United King-
dom have evolved from its membership in the EU). The report also noted that mu-
nicipal law of member states is shaped by the EU, which "increasingly regulates
business, social, health, safety, and other norms in Western Europe." Id. at 1-2.
85. Id. at 1-3.
86. At the time, Senator Roth, a Republican, represented Delaware and chaired
the Senate Finance Committee. Stephen Barr, IRS Watchdog Says Bark Was Unin-
tended: Inspector's Memo Hinted at Case Quotas for Agents, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
1999, at A3.
87. At the time, Senator Moynihan represented New York and was the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee. Ellen E. Schultz, Bill Would Require
Greater Disclosure When Employers Change Pension Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19,
1999, at B8.
88. Andrew Marshall, U.S. Senators Call for Britain to Join Nafta, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 20, 1999, at 21.
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18, 1999, under the authority of Section 1332(g) of the Tariff Act
of 1930,89 the Senate Finance Committee formally requested the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to "investigate the
impact of including the United Kingdom in a free trade agree-
ment with the United States, Canada, and Mexico." 90 The ITC
Report resulted from a nine-month study analyzing the impact
of the proposed trade arrangement on the economic relation-
ships between the countries.91
The ITC Report made special note of the "healthy trade re-
lationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom
leading to increased trade and investment. 92 With the United
States as an ally after World War II, the United Kingdom did
not believe a close alliance with Europe was necessary.93 Sup-
port from the United States for a united Europe dampened this
relationship during the 1960s.94 However, many Britons still
feel a "special relationship" with the United States.95 This sen-
89. The statute reads, in pertinent part, that "[tihe commission shall put at the
disposal of... the Committee on Finance of the Senate, whenever requested, all in-
formation at its command, and shall make such investigations and reports as may
be requested by the.., said committees or by either branch of the Congress." Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1332(g) (1988).
90. ITC Report, supra note 60 at 1-1.
91. Id. Specifically, the Senate Finance Committee requested that the Com-
mission's report include:
(i) an overview of the current economic relationship among the United
States, Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom (U.K.);
(ii) the identification of all existing barriers to trade and investment
among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the U.K.;
(iii) for the United States and the U.K, the estimated effect of eliminating
these barriers on a number of economic aggregates; and
(iv) a discussion on any increase in the quality or selection of goods, or
other consumer benefits.
Id. at ix.
92. Id. atx.
93. "Britain did not feel the need to look to Europe for friends when she was
the 'close ally and associate of her great comrade-in-arms, America."' Neely, supra
note 35 at 117 (quoting M. SHANKS & J. LAMBERT, THE COMMON MARKET TODAY
AND TOMORROW 18 (1962).
94. Id.
95. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Forging a Bipartisan and Strategic Approach to For-
eign Affairs, 43 U. MIAMI L REV. 5, 7 (1988).
There is no doubt, for example, that our Anglophile feelings had a lot to do
vith the emergence of the Anglo- American alliance in World War II, and
with the special relationship between the United States and Great United
Kingdom, that remains after the war and extends into the alliance that we
undertook with Europe.
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timent is demonstrated by the fact that the United States is the
United Kingdom's largest trading partner. 96 The ITC report
mentioned the "similar business cultures, the English language,
similar law and tax structures, and shared liberalization in tele-
communications, financial sectors, and energy" as reasons for
the vast trade between the two countries. 97
The question remains whether there are advantages to the
United Kingdom joining NAFTA. U.S. Senator Phil Gramm 98
outlined some advantages during his speech to the Centre of
Public Policy in July 2000. Gramm has been an advocate of free
trade during his years in the Senate and believes that there
should be "no impediments to the trade of legally-produced and
sold goods."99 To accomplish his hope for free trade throughout
the world, the Senator argues that free trade must exist be-
tween the United States and Europe. 100 An agreement between
the United Kingdom and the United States would be a vital first
step in creating an eventual trading zone between Europe and
North America. 1°1 He sees the EU as a hindrance to free
trade10 2 since regional trade blocs result in increased protection-
ism toward those outside the blocs. 103
Gramm asserts that global free trade brings about more
positive changes than does political diplomacy. 104 He credited
the market forces from the free trade policies of the Unites
States with Asia and Western Europe as bringing down com-
munism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 0 5 He con-
tends that the current EU promotes protectionism 0 6 and cites
Id.
96. Trade with the United States totals 13% of total U.K trade and 90% of
U.K trade with North America. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 2-1.
97. Id. at 1-5.
98. At the time, Senator Gramm was a Republican from Texas and chairman of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Likely New Senate
Committee Chairmen, WASH. POST, May 25, 2001, at A37.
99. Gramm Address, supra note 5.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Gramm discussed the period after World War I as a time when the United
States attempted to promulgate changes in the world through treaties. Id. How-
ever, this policy was not successful, according to Gramm, and after World War II,
the U.S. policy focused on economics. Id. With $13 billion in aid at the time through
the Marshall Plan, the U.S. markets purchased goods in Asia and Europe and, ac-
cording to Gramm, world trade expanded markets in Europe and Asia. Id.
105. Gramm Address, supra note 5.
106. Id.
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examples of nations that were required to increase tariffs as a
condition to EU membership.10 7 The Senator claims that this
condition of membership is a violation of Article XXIV of the
GATT, which prohibits regional trading blocs from erecting
trade barriers between member nations and non-member na-
tions. 08 He views the United Kingdom's involvement with
NAFTA as a potential disruption of a regional trading bloc,
which will facilitate free trade throughout the world.10 9
Gramm advocates a free trade agreement between the EU
and NAFTA countries. 110 However, despite his belief in free
trade throughout the world, he feels that such an agreement is
not currently possible"' because countries such as Greece and
France would not support the arrangement. 112
C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EU
Historically, the United States has supported unification of
Europe and maintained close ties with the EU." 3 The EU is the
United States' single largest trading and investment partner," 4
which has prompted several cooperative efforts between the two.
In November 1990, the United States and the EU adopted the
Transatlantic Declaration, 115 which outlines economic, scientific,
educational, and cultural cooperation between the two, and es-
tablishes biannual meetings between the presidents of the U.S.
and the EU Commission." 6
In July 1994, a joint U.S.-EU summit was held in Berlin."17
The purpose of the summit was to establish cooperative efforts
in the areas of foreign and security policy, combat organized
107. Id.
108. GATT art. XXIV. Gramm states that Article XXIV requires that "a re-
gional arrangement must facilitate trade among members not raise trade barriers
between its members and other nations." Gramm Address, supra note 5.
109. Gramm Address, supra note 5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. John R. McIntyre, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in U.S.-EU Economic
Relations: The Antidote of Regulatory Cooperation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1698,
1699 (1995).
114. Id.
115. Transatlantic Declaration on EC-U.S. Relations, Nov. 22, 1990, U.S.-EU,
available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/us/
economic-partenership/declaration_1990.htm. [hereinafter Transatlantic Declara-
tion].
116. McIntyre, supra note 113, at 1699.
117. Id.
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crime and drug trafficking, and promote democracy and eco-
nomic cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. 118
Relations between the United States and the EU took a fur-
ther step toward increased cooperation in December 1995, when
President Clinton, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez," 9 and Presi-
dent Jacques Santer 120 signed the New Transatlantic Agenda
(NTA).121 The NTA is designed to further cooperation and con-
sultation between the United States and the EU in the areas of
diplomacy, response to global societal challenges, expanding in-
ternational economic relations, and people-to-people relations. 122
The main purpose of the NTA was to determine the future
economic and political partnership between the United States
and the EU in the post-Cold War era. 23 Ambassador Stuart
Eizenstat 124 proclaimed the signing of the NTA "the most
significant step in U.S.-EU relations since the beginning of
European integration in the 1950s."125
118. Id. at 1700.
119. Prime Minister Gonzalez was prime minister of Spain from 1982-1996.
Carlta Vitathum, Socialist Party in Spain Elects a New Leader, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
July 24, 2000, at 2.
120. President Santer was president of the European Commission, the executive
body of the EU. Anne Swardson, EU Nations Find Accord on Budget, Plan Looks
Ahead to Expanded Union, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1999, at A30.
121. Hugo Paemen, Looking Back... And Ahead, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J 529,
530 (2000).
122. The New Transatlantic Agenda, Dec. 3, 1995, U.S.-EU, 6 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1995, at 894-95 [hereinafter NTA].
123. Id. at 894.
124. Ambassador Eizenstat served as the U.S. Representative to the EU. Craig
R. Karpe, European Cultural Protectionism and the Socioeconomic Forces That Will
Defeat It, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425 (1995).
125. Paemen, supra note 121, at 530.
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III. MEMBERSHIP IN NAFTA WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.K. MEMBERSHIP IN NAFTA:
THE NEGATIVES OUTWEIGH THE POSITIVES
1. The Study Conducted by the United States International
Trade Commission
The Senate Finance Committee, when commissioning the
ITC Report, requested that that the ITC study the effects of
U.K. membership in NAFTA on the economies of the United
States and the United Kingdom in the following areas:
(a) the volume of trade in goods and services between the two countries; (b)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each country resulting from increased trade
and investment; (c) employment across industry sectors; (d) amount of foreign
direct investment (FDI) between the two countries; and (e) final prices paid by
consumers in each country.126
The ITC Report analyzed each of the above items under two
models. The first was a U.K.-NAFTA agreement with the
United Kingdom remaining a member of the EU. 127 The second
looked at a U.K.-NAFTA agreement with the United Kingdom
withdrawing from the EU.'28 Under the first model, trade be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom modestly in-
creases. 129 The second model demonstrates similarly modest in-
creases in U.S.-U.K. trade. 130 However, the second model shows
a large decrease in trade between the United Kingdom and
Europe.131 These sharp decreases are based on the trade barri-
126. ITC Report, supra note 60, at Appendix A (Letter from Senator William V.
Roth, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, to the Honorable
Lynn M. Bragg, Chairperson of the United States International Trade Commission
dated November 18, 1999).
127. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 4-4.
128. Id.
129. U.S. exports would increase by $1.9 billion (0.24%) and imports would in-
crease by $2.9 billion (0.32%). Id. at 4-5. U.K. exports would increase by $1.7 billion
(0.57%) and imports would increase $3 billion (0.94%) under the same model. Id.
130. Under this model, U.S. exports are predicted to increase by $2 billion
(0.29%). Id. at 4-8. Imports are predicted to increase by $5.2 billion (0.61%). Id. at
4-12.
131. Under the same model, U.K. exports are expected to increase by $8.8 billion
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ers that the United Kingdom would face from the EU upon
withdrawal. 132 As statistics show under both models, with the
exception of U.K.-EU trade, the effect of U.K. membership in
NAFTA on exports and imports would be minimal.
The United Kingdom and United States economies would
see negligible growth if the United Kingdom joined NAFTA.
Under both models, the ITC found minimal effects on various
economic indicators for the United Kingdom and the United
States. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) gains under both models
appear to be statistically insignificant. 133 U.K. and U.S. labor
markets would be largely unaffected by membership in NAFTA,
with the largest increases in the U.K. textile and transportation
industries and the U.S. agricultural industry. 34
Additionally, foreign direct investment (FDI) would see
minimal changes because of U.K. membership in NAFTA. 131
FDI are assets within a foreign country held by a domestic cor-
poration. 36 FDI accounts for between thirty to forty percent of
world trade.137 Increasing FDI expands world trade because for-
eign corporations purchase goods and supplies from their home
countries. 138 Some trade experts theorized that FDI would in-
to NAFTA members, but decrease by $18.8 billion to EU members. Id. Total U.K
imports would decrease by $13.8 billion (4.34%). Id.
132. Id.
133. Using the first model, U.K GDP would increase by $100 million (0.10%)
and U.S. GDP would increase by $55 million (near 0%). ITC Report, supra note 60,
at 4-6. The ITC Report noted that the GDP for the EU would decrease by $1 million
and the GDP for Canada would decrease by $42 million. Id. Under the second
model, the U.K GDP would decrease by $173 million (0.02%) and the U.S. GDP
would increase by $86 million (less than 0.001%). Id. at 4-13. GDP for the EU
would decrease by $708 million and the GDP for Canada would decrease by $49 mil-
lion. Id.
134. Looking at both skilled and unskilled laborers, the demand under the first
model agreement appears to be small in both the United States and the United
Kingdom. Id. at 4-7. The largest demand increase in the United States would be in
the agricultural sector, with an increase of 0.15%. Id. at 4-11. The largest demand
increase in the United Kingdom would be in the textiles and apparel sector, with a
projected increase of 1.26%. Id. Most other sectors would likely increase or decrease
by less than 0.25%. Id. Under the second model, the demand for skilled and un-
skilled labor would see modest increases projected to be between 0.01 and 0.23% in
the United States. Id. at 4-17. The U.K's labor market would see more dramatic
changes, especially in the textiles and apparel sector and the transportation sector.
Id. The textiles sector would see a decrease of 3.4% whereas the transportation sec-
tor would decrease by 6%. Id.
135. Id.
136. Charles 0. Roehrdanz, Reducing the U.S. -Japan Trade Deficit by Eliminat-
ing Japanese Barriers to FDI, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305 (1995).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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crease if the United Kingdom altered its relationship with the
EU. 139 This increase is due to decreasing the economic regula-
tory burden on the United Kingdom from the EU.140 The major-
ity of trade experts interviewed by the ITC agreed that FDI
would decline if U.K.-EU relations were altered.141 Many ex-
perts felt that investment would decline if the United Kingdom
did not adopt the euro, 42 making it appear likely that invest-
ment would decline if a more drastic move were adopted by al-
tering U.K.-EU relations. 43
The ITC Report also noted that several experts do not be-
lieve United Kingdom's adoption of the euro is necessary to at-
tract FDI.144 Other factors have attracted foreign investors to
the United Kingdom including relatively low wages, tax rates,
business regulations, and a pro-business legal system. 45 These
factors will continue to attract business investment in the
United Kingdom. 46 The ITC Report stated that the United
Kingdom is an attractive foreign investment choice because it is
within the EU's Common External Tariff.147 Companies also in-
vest in the United Kingdom because they see the United King-
dom's EU membership as a method of gaining access to the EU's
political decision makers. 148 Applying the two models, the ITC
Report found that FDI would show almost no change under both
models. 149
Applying both models, the ITC Report demonstrated that
manufacturing output would show insignificant changes. 150 The
139. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The euro is the single European monetary currency, currently adopted by
eleven EU countries, but not yet by United Kingdom. Rosali Pretorius, European
Monetary Union: Part I, I.B.F.L. 1998 16(12), 131-135, 132 (1998).
143. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-4. "Many U.K. government, business, and
union contacts reported that evidence exists from static inward investment figures
for 1998 and in highly publicized remarks of Japanese automobile manufacturers
that the U.K. stands to lose inward investment if it does not join the Single Euro-
pean Currency." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (noting that many investors invest in United Kingdom because of their
membership in the EU).
148. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-4.
149. Using the first model, the ITC reported that U.K. FDI in the United States
would increase by 0.41% and U.S. FDI would increase by 0.27% in the United King-
dom. Id. at 4-21. Under the second model, the ITC studied only U.S. FDI in the
United Kingdom and found a small decrease of 0.56%. Id.
150. Under the first model presented, the ITC found that U.K. manufacturing
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ITC reiterated the view of academics and government officials
that output from the EU would substantially decrease if the
United Kingdom were to leave the EU.151 Examining the prices
that would be paid by consumers, the ITC used only the second
model, finding modest decreases across market sectors, al-
though the decreases in the United States were less modest
than in the United Kingdom. 15 2
The ITC also looked closely at the relationship between
Europe and the United Kingdom. 153 Business and government
experts were divided on whether the effect would be detrimental
to the United Kingdom. 54 Some took the view that a "substan-
tive alteration" to the relationship between the United Kingdom
and the EU could be damaging. 55 The EU could apply certain
tariffs in U.K. sectors such as financial services, agriculture,
and goods and services. 56 Some commentators argued that the
EU has a high trade volume with the United Kingdom and
would not want to impose excessive tariffs and barriers upon a
country in which it highly invests. 57 Business leaders are also
concerned that the United Kingdom will have to renegotiate all
of the trade agreements the EU signed on behalf of the United
Kingdom. 5 8 This could affect the renegotiated agreements, as
the United Kingdom's position may not be "as strong as that of
the EU as a whole."15 9
There are two other major areas that could be affected by a
new NAFTA agreement that includes the United Kingdom: the
output in the United States is projected to increase $408 million (0.27%). Id. at 4-22.
The ITC also found that American manufacturing output in the United Kingdom
would likely increase by $413 million (0.27%). Id. Under the second model, the ITC
looked at only foreign manufacturing output in the United Kingdom. Id. The ITC
predicted a decrease of $851 million (0.56%) of U.S. output in the United Kingdom.
Id. at 4-22.
151. Id.
152. The ITC found modest increases in U.S. prices, ranging from 0.15% to
0.31%. Id. at 4-17. In the United Kingdom, the ITC found modest decreases across
market sectors, though less modest than the U.S. increases, ranging from 0.25% to
1.18%. Id.
153. Id. at 1-2.
154. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-3. (stating that this could cause commercial
uncertainty and result in "currency volatility and investment flight").
155. The business leaders were especially concerned with the effect that may be
incurred through the "adjustment period" after the United Kingdom and the EU al-
ter their relationship and that this "could be extremely damaging to the U.K econ-
omy." Id. at 1-4.
156. Id. at 1-3.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1-3-1-4.
159. Id. at 1-4.
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EU's regulatory burden and agriculture. Economists are split as
to whether the EU regulations help or hinder U.K. economic
competitiveness. 160 The EU social charter imposes several regu-
lations on employee and labor relations and workplace rights.161
Difficulty in determining the actual business costs of the EU so-
cial policy also makes assessing the extent of the regulatory
burden challenging. 162 If the United Kingdom left the EU and
joined NAFTA, U.K. businesses would no longer be subject to
these regulations.
Agriculture is the other major area that would be af-
fected.163 Currently, U.K. agriculture is subject to the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which regulates agricultural prices. 164
The ITC Report noted that there is a "virtual consensus" that
these price regulations allow U.K. agricultural products to be
sold globally. 165 Very few U.K. agricultural sectors would be
competitive in the world's agricultural markets without this
price support structure. 66 A minority of economists disagreed
and argued that the United Kingdom would benefit from the
lower prices that elimination of the CAP would provide. 167
The ITC Report provided the most extensive study to date
on U.K. membership in NAFTA, although international econo-
mist Keith Marsden also studied the issue for the Centre for
Policy Studies in London. 68 Despite the fact that both Gramm
and Marsden believe that NAFTA is an opportunity for greater
economic benefit for the United Kingdom, the ITC Report dem-
onstrated that the economic benefits would be minimal.69  Nei-
160. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-3.
161. Id. (noting such requirements as the Collective Redundancies Directive
concerning redundancy payments, EU mandates requiring companies to meet with
unions in certain circumstances, and the EU Acquired Rights Directive protecting
the rights of employees when their companies are taken over and the EU Social
Charter, which outlines several rights of employees in the workplace).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1-5.
164. The ITC report described three methods of price regulation: "price supports,
achieved by creating tariff barriers, providing export subsidies and purchasing ex-
cess supplies; taxpayers' support, channeled directly to farms, based on the number
of animals held and land acreage; and a series of price controls-price supports or di-
rect payment." Id.
165. Id.
166. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-5.
167. Id.
168. Keith Marsden, Towards a Treaty of Commerce-Euroland and NAFTA,
Centre for Policy Studies, at http://www.cps.org.uk/nafta.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2001).
169. Id.
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ther Gramm nor Marsden presented statistical evidence in their
speculations contrary to the ITC's findings. 7 ' Therefore, it does
not appear that there are significant economic benefits that
would warrant the United Kingdom changing its current eco-
nomic trade relationships.
2. The Study Conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies
Early in 2000 Marsden conducted a study to examine
whether the United Kingdom should continue to acquiesce to
EU trade policy or join a different trade agreement, most nota-
bly NAFTA. 171 Marsden's study found that NAFTA countries 172
have larger and more prosperous markets than the EU, with
thirty-eight percent more consumers and a twenty percent
higher rate of GDP. 173 In addition, the average worker in a
NAFTA country is more likely to earn more and pay fewer taxes
than the average EU worker.174 For example, in the United
States, a single worker with no children averages a net income
of $20,388 per year, which is higher than the average German
single worker, who earns $16,577 per year.175 Dual-income cou-
ples earning wages in the United States average a net income of
$35,151, while in Germany they average $31,199.176
Marsden's study also concluded that the economies of
NAFTA are showing greater expansion than the economies of
the EU. 177 The GDP has grown 3.6 percent among NAFTA
countries over the past seven years, while in the EU; the GDP
has grown only 1.8 percent. 178 NAFTA countries engage in more
trade than EU countries. 179 Approximately sixty percent of
NAFTA's imports come from beyond NAFTA countries whereas
only thirty-seven percent of the EU's imports come from beyond
the EU countries. 80 The EU countries rely more heavily on sub-
sidies than NAFTA countries. Reported subsidies in the EU to-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The NAFTA Countries are the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
NAFTA, supra note 20, pmbl.
173. Marsden, supra note 168.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Marsden, supra note 168.
180. Id.
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total $203 billion versus $33 billion in the United States. 81
Based on the foregoing examination showing NAFTA as more
prosperous and a greater opportunity for U.K. trade, Marsden
concluded that it might not be in the United Kingdom's best
interest to remain in the EU. 8 2
B. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.K. MEMBERSHIP IN NAFTA
One issue raised with U.K. membership in NAFTA is
whether the EU has any legal authority to prevent the ar-
rangement. The legal precedence is not entirely clear, but there
are suggestions that the EU would have the ability to block such
an agreement. 18 3 The EU adheres to a Common Commercial
Policy binding on all member states.1 8 4 This policy provides for
harmonious economic and market interests for the EU member
states based on "uniform principles." 85 The policy also author-
izes the EU Commission to "open the necessary negotiations" for
"agreements with one or more [member] States or international
organizations." 8 6  Whether this extends to the independent
treaty-making powers of the EU member states has been dis-
puted. 8 7
In 1975, the ECJ held that Article 113 of the EC Treaty was
within the exclusive competence of the EU and that member
states must adapt their interests to the common interests of the
EU. l88 This holding could have the effect of member states
adopting positions inconsistent with the EU, thereby disturbing
the "institutional framework" of the EU. 8 9 In areas where the
EU has legislatively acted, this ruling restricts a member state's
regulation to the extent that it differs from the EU act.190 This
181. Id.
182. Id. Some in United Kingdom who advocate joining NAFTA feel that
NAFTA members' "behaviour are more congenial." Id.
183. Conceivably, the ECJ's holding that it can bind EU member states without
their consent through an international agreement suggests that the EU could block
a treaty concluded by a member state. Judith Hippler Bello, International Deci-
sions, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 772, 787 (1995).
184. EC TREATY art. 133.
185. EC TREATY art. 133.
186. EC TREATY art. 133.
187. Rudolf Geiger, External Competences of the European Union and the
Treaty-Making Power of its Member States, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319, 320
(1997).
188. Id. at 323.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 324.
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result renders the EU's treaty-making power exclusive. 191
Member states are not permitted to make a treaty in an area al-
ready covered by EU law which would, "if not legally, but at any
rate politically-endanger the application of EU law already en-
acted in the field concerned."192
In 1994, the ECJ held that the EU could legally join inter-
national trade agreements that are binding on member states
without the individual ratification of each member state.'9 3 The
most notable example of this ECJ decision is EU membership in
the World Trade Organization. 194 The EU claimed while nego-
tiations would be "in very close connection with member states,"
the WTO's ratification was solely within the authority of the
EU.195 Member states disputed this position and claimed that
authority for the ratification of the WTO agreement was joint
and not exclusively with the EU.196 The ECJ determined that
pursuant to Article 113 of the EC Treaty, the EC has sole au-
thority to conclude the multilateral agreements on trade in
goods.' 97 Previously, the ECJ had held that all trade transac-
tions were under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy.19
This precedent led to the 1994 ruling that the EU was exclu-
sively authorized to conclude the WTO agreement. 99
The 1994 ECJ ruling could greatly affect the treaty-making
power of the member states. Currently, member states of the
EU are subject to the direct effects doctrine, which states that
laws passed by the EU take precedence over the laws of the
member states.200 If the EU's treaty-making power were an ex-
tension of the direct effect doctrine, then the EU would be im-
posing its sovereignty in an area that many member states con-
sider fundamental to their existence as a "subject of
international law."20 Treaty-making power is one aspect of a
state's capacity to "enter into relations with other States," one of
the four qualifications of a State as a "person of international
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Bello, supra note 183, at 772.
194. Id.
195. Case Law, WTO-Agreement, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 338, 339 (1995).
196. Id.
197. Bello, supra note 183, at 772. The multilateral agreements were the WTO's
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Id.
198. Geiger, supra note 187, at 326.
199. Id.
200. Brand, supra note 52, at 572.
201. Geiger, supra note 187 at 320.
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law."20 2 Member states have negotiated international agree-
ments jointly with the EU, perhaps to maintain their seemingly
limited sovereignty. 20 3
Proponents of U.K. membership in NAFTA argue that any
action by the EU against the United Kingdom for joining
NAFTA would be contrary to the WTO's policy of encouraging
the establishment of free trade unions. 204 These proponents
have misinterpreted the purpose of the WTO. The Final Act
Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations ("Final Act")205 established the WT0 20 6 to facilitate
international cooperation on trade and economic relations.2 7
The Final Act also adopted the principles of the GATT.20 8 The
GATT, which was incorporated by the GATT 1994,209 provides
states should not be refrained from entering into free trade
202. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933,
art. 1, 49 Stat. 3099, 3100 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. "The State as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a perma-
nent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with other States."
203. Geiger, supra note 1, at 320.
204. See Kite, supra note 64, at 10. The proponents are likely referring to Arti-
cle XXIV of the GATT, incorporated by the WTO Agreement, which states that:
The Contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of
trade by the development through voluntary agreements, of closer integra-
tion of the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They
also recognize the purpose of a customs union or of a free trade area should
be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
GATT art. XXIV.
205. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; See Thomas J.
Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order For World Trade?, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 350 (1995).
206. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [herein-
after WTO Agreement], art. 1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
207. Dillon, supra note 205, at 350.
208. Id.
209. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT 1994") shall consist
of:
(a) the provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30
October 1947... (b) the provisions of the legal instruments.., that have en-
tered into force under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement
WTO Agreement, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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agreements. 210 Since the EU is a member of the WTO, it must
follow that the EU assure its member states observe the princi-
ples of the GATT, including allowing its member states to enter
into free trade agreements.
Under the direct effects doctrine, EU law prevails over both
legislation of the member states and their national courts.21
According to the doctrine of primacy, EU law takes precedence
over the member states' municipal law even if the law was
passed subsequent to the EU law. 212 These two doctrines pre-
vent member states from trumping EU law by passing their own
law against it, a unique concept in international law.213
The ECJ had held the GATT provisions are within the sole
jurisdiction of the ECJ and are not to be interpreted by the na-
tional courts. 214 The ECJ also held that provisions within the
GATT are to be applied toward relations between the EU and
non-member parties, not within the EU itself.21 5 In essence, this
means that EU members cannot challenge actions based on the
GATT unless the action is against a non-EU party.216 EU mem-
ber states "are formally GATT members but cannot participate
in GATT dispute settlement proceedings [and] ... cannot invoke
GATT provisions before the Court of Justice either."21 7 By deny-
ing member states the ability to invoke rights in a treaty to
which they are signatories, the ECJ has demonstrated a trans-
fer of sovereignty from the member states to the EU.218 The
ECJ has since ruled that the EU has "exclusive competence over
international trade of goods,"219 but that the EU has joint compe-
tence with member states regarding two other WTO agree-
ments, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS)
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
210. See generally GATT pmbl.
211. Brand, supra note 52, at 572.
212. Id. at 575.
213. Id.
214. Cases 267-269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa
Petrolifera Inaliana SpA and others, 1983 E.C.R. 801, 1 C.M.L.R. 354 (1984).
215. Case 266/81, Societa Italiana per L'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v. Minis-
tero delle Finanze, 1983 E.C.R. 731.
216. Brand, supra note 52, at 579.
217. Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Status of GATT in EC Law, Revisited:
The Consequences of the Judgment on the Banana Import Regime for the Enforce-
ment of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 53, 58 (1995).
218. Brand, supra note 52, at 603.
219. James J. Callaghan, Analysis of the European Court of Justice's Decision on
Competence in the World Trade Organization: Who Will Call the Shots in the Areas
of Services and Intellectual Property in the European Union?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 497, 499 (1996).
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Property Rights (TRIPS).220
GATT principles, which have been embraced by the WTO,
encourage member states to enter into free trade agreements.
As a party to the GATT 1994, the EU would seem to be violating
these principles if it prevented the United Kingdom from enter-
ing into NAFTA. However, the United Kingdom is also a signa-
tory to the EC Treaty, which means that it is bound to conform
its interests to the Common Commercial Policy in Article 113.
With the ECJ ruling that member states, such as the United
Kingdom, cannot make treaties that are against EU law, if the
ECJ holds that the United Kingdom joining NAFTA would be
against the Common Commercial Policy, the United Kingdom
could initiate a dispute settlement with the WTO. Though the
WTO encourages free trade agreements, it is not clear how the
WTO would resolve the issue. The WTO, through the principles
adopted in the GATT 1994, officially encourages customs unions
such as the EU. 221 It is not likely that the WTO would intervene
in an internal dispute, so the EU could probably be successful in
either preventing the United Kingdom from joining or creating
negative trade consequences for the United Kingdom if it is suc-
cessful in joining NAFTA. With the risk of possible sanctions
against the United Kingdom for a breach of treaty, it seems that
the proponents of U.K. membership in NAFTA are greatly un-
derestimating the legal consequences of such membership.
C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.K. MEMBERSHIP IN NAFTA
The United Kingdom is in a unique political position be-
cause of its close relationship with the United States and its
membership in the EU.222 These relationships allow the United
220. Id.
221. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reads:
Members... recognizing that customs unions and free trade areas have
greatly increased in number since the establishment of the GAT[ 1947 and
today cover a significant portion of world trade ... [rleaffirming that the pur-
pose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories and not to raise trade barriers to the trade of other Members with
such territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to
them should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on
the trade of other Members.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1161 (1994).
222. McCabe, supra note 81, at 13.
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Kingdom to act as a "bridge" between the United States and
Europe. 223 It also affords the United Kingdom influence within
Europe and in the United States. If the United Kingdom were
to withdraw from the EU as a result of NAFTA membership,
three million jobs that are dependent on EU membership would
be at risk.224 Additionally, the United Kingdom would be a "far
less attractive partner" if it withdrew from the EU and, instead
of being in the "centre of influence in Washington," it would "put
[the United Kingdom] at the margins."225
The United Kingdom would be losing more than it gains by
NAFTA membership because upon joining it would not exert
great influence. The terms of NAFTA require each signatory to
treat foreign corporations and domestic corporations equally.22 6
It has been argued that in reality, foreign corporations are given
preference, and some fear large U.S. corporations may be able to
impose "unsavory practices" on the United Kingdom.22 7 The
United Kingdom would be unable to change the terms of the
agreement because the agreement has already been negotiated
and ratified without the United Kingdom. 228 Opponents to a
NAFTA-U.K. agreement feel that entering into this agreement
without participating in the negotiations would be disadvanta-
geous for the United Kingdom. 229
The United Kingdom has gradually increased its ties with
the EU. The EU adopted the "four freedoms" as items that have
free movement within the EU: "goods, services, workers, and fi-
nancial transactions."230  Though the United States is the
United Kingdom's largest trading partner, more than half of the
United Kingdom's trade is with the EU.231 This figure is signifi-
cantly lower than other EU countries. 232 While the increasing
trade relationship does not rule out the possibility of NAFTA
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Monbiot, supra note 1, at 20.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. ITC Report, supra note 60, at 1-2. The European Community, when it was
founded, adopted the original four freedoms. Id. Since its adoption, several new
freedoms have been added, resulting in a "total body of law," or "Acquis Communi-
taire," consisting of legislation and treaties, which "profoundly affects many com-
mercial and social areas of the European common market." Id.
231. Id. at 1-3. The report noted that external trade with the EU accounts for
approximately 52% of the trade with the United Kingdom. Id. at ix.
232. Id. at 1-3.
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membership, it does suggest that the United Kingdom is accli-
mating as an EU member. Closer U.K. involvement could mean
increased trade with the EU.233 The feeling among business and
government leaders in the United Kingdom is that, realistically,
the United Kingdom's future lies in Europe. 234
CONCLUSION
While the proposed U.K. membership in NAFTA has gained
backing by some free trade advocates in the United State's Re-
publican Party and the United Kingdom's Conservative Party,
members of these parties have failed to fully consider the impli-
cations of their proposal. Looking closer at the proposal, it ap-
pears there are minimal advantages to U.K. membership in
NAFTA. Economic gains would likely be quite modest with sig-
nificant decreases in labor demand and FDI if the United King-
dom terminated its EU membership. With the EU's legal au-
thority over its member states, including the United Kingdom, it
appears that the EU could take legal action or even possibly
force the United Kingdom out of the EU for what may be deter-
mined a breach of the EC Treaty. Even if the United Kingdom
appeals the EU action to the WTO, it could place itself in the
center of an international conflict that has the potential to dam-
age its political relations with its EU counterparts. Although it
is not clear how the WTO would resolve the dispute, any poten-
tial benefits to U.K. membership in NAFTA would be out-
weighed by the costs. The United States would also experience
great costs, as its reliance on the United Kingdom for access to
the EU market would be jeopardized, with only modest eco-
nomic gains. It would be best for both countries to maintain the
status quo.
233. The report found that this trend is already occurring. Id. "As the United
Kingdom and the EU evolve closer together ... an increasing percentage of the
United Kingdom's overall trade and investment is already taking place within the
EU." Id.
234. Id.
20021

